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Recent Developments

Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC:
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
HELD APPliCABLE TO FEDERAL
RACE-CONSCIOUS PROGRAMS

In Metro Broadcasting, fnc. v. FCC,
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990), the Supreme
Court held that FCC race-conscious
minority preference policies did not violate equal protection principles. The
Court applied a mid-level standard of
review to determine that the FCC policies were substantially related to the
achievement of the important governmental objective of broadcast diversity.
In the first of two consolidated cases
the petitioner, Metro Broadcasting
(Metro), challenged the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) policy
awarding preference to minority broadcast station owners in comparative hearings. Rainbow Broadcasting (Rainbow),
a minority owned company, received a
contract to construct and operate a new
UHF television station, upon which
Metro Broadcasting, a nonminority
company, also bade. After a comparative
hearing, the FCC gave Rainbow a higher
rating than Metro based on Rainbow's
ninety percent minority ownership. The
Board determined that Rainbow's minority
credit outweighed Metro's local residence and civic participation, and thus
awarded the contract to Rainbow. Metro
Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3005-06.
In the companion case, respondent,
Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford
(Shurberg), challenged the FCC's "distress sale" policy contending it violated
its equal protection rights under the
fifth amendment. The distress sale policy permitted a radio or television broadcaster, whose license has been designated for a revocation hearing, to assign

or transfer the license to an FCC approyed minority enterprise. Astroline
Communications (Astroline), a minority enterprise, purchased an existing
broadcast license through a distress
sale, thereby precluding Shurberg, a
nonminority enterprise, from competing for the license. The FCC relied on
congressional action and found Shurberg's equal protection claim meritless.
fd. at 3007. Both Shurberg and Metro
appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals invalidated
the FCC distress sale policy as it deprived
Shurberg of its constitutional right to
equal protection under the fifth amendment. fd. The court affirmed the FCC's
decision in Metro as supported by congressional action. Metro's petitions for a
rehearing were denied.
The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the issue of
whether the FCC's minority preference
policies violated equal protection principles under the fifth amendment. In
reviewing these consolidated cases, the
Court emphasized the expressed action
of Congress to implement these policies. The Court, relying on Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), noted
that the appropriate deference must be
given to Congress' power to provide for
the general welfare of the United States
and enforce by legislation the equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment. Metro Broadcasting, 110
S. Ct. at 3008.
In deciding Metro Broadcasting, the
Court had to choose between its analysis in Fullilove v. Klutznick and City of
Richmond v. fA. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989). In Fullilove the Court applied a mid-level scrutiny analysis and

found constitutional a congressionally
imposed minority set-aside under which
ten percent of all federal funds used for
local public works projects were required to go to Minority Business Enterprises. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at
3009. However, in Croson, a recent
minority set-aside case, the Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis and rejected
as unconstitutional a Minority Business
Enterprise program enacted by a local
government. fd.
Adopting the position taken by three
justices in Fullilove, the Court determined that an intermediate level of
scrutiny should be applied to the FCC
race-based classifications. In doing so,
the Court held that benign racial measures mandated by Congress were constitutionally permissible to the extent
that they served an important governmental objective and are substantially
related to the achievement of those
objectives. fd. The Court reasoned that
such race-conscious measures mandated
by Congress were permissible even if
they were not '''remedial' in the sense of
being designed to compensate victims
of past governmental or societal discrimination...." fd.
The Court went on to distinguish
Metro Broadcasting from Croson. The
Court noted the presence of congressional action in Metro as opposed to
state legislative action in Croson. fd. The
Court then determined that Croson did
not undermine Fullilove, but underscored it. ReasOning that the federal
government had traditionally been more
instrumental than state legislatures in
combatting racial discrimination, the
Court held the rationale in Fullilove
recognized that the race-conscious classifications adopted by Congress were
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subject to a different standard of review
than classifications prescribed by state
and local governments. [d. Thus, applying the mid-level standard of scrutiny
proposed by Fullilove, the Court held
the FCC minority ownership policies
constitutional. [d. at 3008-09.
In upholding the FCC's minority policy, the Court held that promoting minority ownership of broadcasting stations served an important governmental
objective. [d. The Court agreed with the
congressional and FCC findings that minority preference policies promoted diversity in programming. [d. The role of
the government, the Court reasoned,
is to promote the dissemination of
diverse information. [d. at 3010. The
Court determined that the process of
disseminating diverse information,
through programming, was essential to
the public welfare, and thus an important governmental objective.
After finding FCC preference policies
served an important governmental objective, the Court determined that the
FCC's policies were substantially related
to the achievement of the government's
interest. [d. In reviewing the nexus
between minority ownership and programming diversity, the Court deferred
to the fact-finding abilities of Congress
and the FCC's expertise and noted that
Congress made clear its view that minority ownership policies advanced the
goal of diverse programming. The Court
further noted Congress' continuallyexpressed support of diversity in programming through minority ownership. [d. at
3012-13.
The Court found race-based classification may be. permissible in some instances. In supporting permissible
benign discrimination, the Court analogized diversity in programming and the
fair cross-section requirement of the
sixth amendment, which forbids excluding groups from a jury venire on the
basis of race or sex. In addition, the
Court compared Metro Broadcasting
with voting rights cases that permit
benign discrimination to involve minorities in the political process. [d. at 3019.
Similarly, the Court reasoned, benign
discrimination is permiSSible to promote
programming diversity. [d.
Next, the Court rejected Shurberg's
final contention that the minority distress policy operated to exclude nonminorities from consideration in the trans30- The Law Forum/21.1

fer of certain stations, and thus unduly
burdens nonminorities. [d. at 3025. As
the majority noted, the policy could only
be invoked at the Commission's discretion and distress sales only involved a
small number of broadcast licenses. Furthermore, the power to invoke the distress sale was in the hands of the nonminority station owner who may choose
to seek renewal by attending an FCC
hearing, rather than sell his license to a
minority group. This, the Court found,
decreased the chance that nonminorities would suffer an undue burden. [d. at
3027.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Kennedy, contended
that the constitution's guarantee of
equal protection bound the federal and
state governments equally, and that no
lower level of scrutiny should be applied
for federal action. [d. at 3030 (O'Connor, )., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
opined that the guarantee of equal protection extended to each citizen, regardless of race. [d. at 3032 (O'Connor,
)., dissenting). Neither the federal
government nor the states may deny any
person equal protection of the laws and
governmental distinctions, she contended,
among citizens based on race or ethnicity would exact costs and carry substantial dangers. [d. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor believed the
FCC policies should have been evaluated under strict scrutiny and that under
such analysis, the FCC policies would
fail. [d. at 3044.
Metro Broadcasting is Significant as it
illustrates the Supreme Court's implementation of an intermediate level of
review for federal race-conscious affirmative action policies. While state programs continue to receive a strict scrutiny standard of review, federal affirmative
action programs with the approval of
Congress, need only survive the mid-.
level test for constitutionality. Metro
Broadcasting also signifies that Fullilove remains good law.
- Daryl D.Jones

Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz:
STATE'S USE OF SOBRIETY
CHECKPOINTS DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), the
United States Supreme Court held that
state highway sobriety checkpoints do
not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Court ruled that the state's
interest in preventing drunk driving
outweighed any intrusion upon drivers.
The Michigan Department of State
Police established a sobriety checkpoint
program in 1986. Under specific gUidelines, sobriety checkpoints would be set
up at selected sites along state roads.
Vehicles passing through the checkpoints would be stopped, and their drivers would be briefly examined for signs
of intoxication. Drivers displaying signs
of alcohol impairment would be directed
to a location out of the traffic flow
where an officer would check the driver's license and car registration and, if
warranted, conduct further sobriety
tests. An arrest would be made if the test
results and observations by the police
suggested that the driver was intoxicated. [d. at 2484. At the only checkpoint operated under the program, two
of the drivers stopped were arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol.
[d.

Respondents, the day before the operation of the first checkpOint, filed a
complaint seeking relief from potential
subjection to the checkpOints. The trial
court applied the balancing test set forth
in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979),
to decide the program's constitutionality. This three prong test involved
"balancing the state's interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk drivers, the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal, and the
level of intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoints." Sitz,
110 s. Ct. at 2484 (citing Brown, 433
u.s. at 50-51). After applying the test,
the trial court determined that the program violated the fourth amendment. [d.
Affirming the decision, the Michigan .
Court of Appeals stated that the trial
court was correct in its findings that the
state had "a 'grave and legitimate' interest in curbing drunken driving; [but]
that sobriety checkpoint programs are

